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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy,”1 and from this fact it follows that giving 
“states the power to tax the church would be tantamount to giving it the power to destroy the 
church.”2  Throughout history, religious institutions have been tax exempt by means of common 
law3 or statutory provisions.4  Tax exemptions have been customary in society since the ancient 
world.5  “Egypt, Sumeria, Babylon and Persia forgave priests and temples their taxes.” 6  Despite 
the long tradition of tax exemptions, most scholars have been unable to pinpoint when government 
tax exemptions for religious institutions became normalized.7  Nevertheless, modern reliance on 
tax exemptions for religious institutions are widespread today and derive from some combination 
of historical precedent, legislative determination, constitutional law, and judicial interpretation.  
The First Amendment contains two clauses that create a spectrum where the government 
balances the interest of the State and the interest of religious institutions.  Through the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause (“the Religion Clauses”), the federal 
government adheres to a basic principle of neutrality towards religion.  The Religion Clauses 
achieve this result by ensuring, via the Establishment Clause, that no particular religion is 
established or preferred over others, while also ensuring, via the Free Exercise Clause, that every 
religion is practiced without discrimination or interference.  In Gitlow v. New York,8 the Supreme 
Court held that the protections of the First Amendment extend to the actions of state and local 
 
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819).  
2 John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 363, 415 (1991).  
3 Id. at 368.  
4 Id. at 389. 
5 Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 974 (1999). 
6 Elizabeth A. Livingston, Note, A Bright Line Points Toward Legal Compromise: IRS Condoned Lobbying 
Activities for Religious Entities and Non-Profits, 9.1 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 2 (2008).  
7 Id.  
8 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, thus, in effect, applying this same principle of 
religious neutrality to all actors at all different levels of government. 
Utilizing the language from the Religion Clauses, the Supreme Court has decided two 
monumental cases concerning the taxation of religious institutions and the “entanglement” 
concerns to which that practice often gives rise.  In 1970, the Supreme Court, in Walz v. Tax 
Commission of New York,9 held that state grants of tax exemptions to religious institutions do not 
violate the Establishment Clause,10 emphasizing that “[e]ach value judgment under the Religion 
Clauses must turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with 
religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so.”11  Shortly after Walz, the Court 
reviewed Lemon v. Kurtzman12, a case regarding government funding of religious primary and 
secondary schools, and expressed that “[t]he objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion 
of either [state or religion] into the precincts of the other.”13  The Court emphasized that 
“prophylactic”14 interactions between state and churches “will involve excessive and enduring 
entanglement between” both institutions.15 
Since Walz and Lemon, state and local governments have attempted to navigate the delicate 
parameters outlined by the Court’s interpretation of the Religion Clauses.  This essay will identify 
various instances in which state and local governments, facilitated by their own courts, have erred 
too far to the side of intruding upon the operation of religious institutions, thus resulting in an 
infringement of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  This essay will exam the history of tax 
exemptions for religious institutions, the Court’s application of the First Amendment’s Religion 
 
9 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
10 Id. at 680.  
11 Id. at 669. 
12 Lemon v. Kurtman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
13 Id. at 614.  
14 Id. at 619. 
15 Id. at 619. 
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Clauses, the Court’s analysis in Walz and Lemon, and modern tax exemptions on religious 
institutions. 
I. THE HISTORY OF TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
A. Tax Exemptions in the Ancient World 
Religious tax exemptions “extend as far into the past as do written records….”16  The 
widespread competition in the ancient world for actual authority between government and 
religious institutions created a necessity for religious tax exemptions. 17  In the ancient world, the 
decision not to tax was largely a decision not to antagonize.”18  The contention between established 
empires and the prominent religious bodies based in those societies led to societal economic 
collapses, the confiscation of wealth from churches, and a desire to destroy through taxation.19  
America’s commitment to a separation of church and state derives in part from historical records 
that indicate that separation protects and preserves religious liberties and the political arena.20 
B. Tax Exemptions in America 
In the United States property tax was a “tax on all forms of property, real and personal, 
tangible and intangible, ‘upon every man according to his estate, and with consideration to all his 
other abilities . . . .’”21  Modern property tax in the “United States is limited largely to real estate, 
reaching only selected items of personal property.”22  State and local government reliance on 
property tax revenues varies.  In recent years, “property taxes accounted for nearly seventy-five 
percent of all local government taxes and thirty-six percent of all state and local taxes combined.”23  
 
16 Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 973 (1999). 
17 Id. at 974. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 974-975. 
20 Id. at 975. 
21 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 867-68 (10th ed. 2014). 
22 Id. at 868. 
23 Id. at 868. 
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Almost all of state and local taxes are derived from property taxes. 24  Property taxes also supply 
“most school districts’ independent revenue.”25  Nonetheless, many states allow broad tax 
exemptions because “[e]xemption of personal property simplifies tax administrations . . . .”26 
Congress, from the beginning of the Nation’s founding, has understood the Religion 
Clauses to authorize tax exemptions for religious institutions.27  In 1802, after the ratification of 
the Constitution, Congress enacted a taxing statute which provided tax exemptions for churches.28  
As a result, an inference may be made that early government participants were aware of the 
existence and implementation of tax exemptions for religious institutions and still, no language 
was developed to undermine its existence.29  Justice Brennan, in his Walz concurrence, expressed 
that existing evidence of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison’s knowledge of religious tax 
exemptions make it unlikely that they would have “remained silent had they thought the 
exemptions established religion.”30 
America’s current laws regarding tax exemptions of religious property stem from two 
traditions: “(1) a common law tradition, which accorded such exemptions to established churches 
that discharged certain governmental burdens; and (2) an equity law tradition, which accorded 
such exemptions to all churches that dispensed certain social benefits.”31  Those traditions 
contributed to the development of state laws (often initially in the form of colonial laws) that 
exempted religious institutions from taxation.32 
 
 
24 Id. at 868. 
25 Id. 
26 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 868. 
27 Walz, 397 U.S. at 677.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 684. 
30 Id. at 684-85. 
31 Witte, Jr., supra note 2, at 368.  
32 Id. 
5 
 
a. Common Law Tradition  
In the colonies, the common law traditions did not automatically provide unrestricted tax 
exemptions to religious institutions.33  All property within a particular jurisdiction was taxable at 
common law unless exempted by a particular legislative act.34  Only certain types of religious 
institutions were considered exemptible.35  These included the “properties of incorporated 
established churches that were devoted to the appropriate ‘religious uses’ prescribed by 
ecclesiastical law, such as chapels, parsonages, glebes, and consecrated cemeteries.”36  “The 
exclusivity of established churches in the 17th and 18th centuries was often carried to prohibition 
of other forms of worship.”37  Generally, churches were often responsible for “quit-rent taxes, poll 
taxes, land taxes” and other similar property taxes.38  The exclusivity of established churches 
diminished exemptions applicable to all types of religious properties throughout the colonies.39 
Oftentimes these exemptions could be lifted in “times of emergency or abandoned 
altogether if the tax liability imposed on remaining properties in the community proved too 
onerous.”40  However, these tax exemptions, were a product of a religious institutions’ 
establishment within a particular colony.41  These established religious institutions were 
effectively arms of the state or “state agencies, and their clergy were effectively state officials.”42  
Consequently, those religious institutions who were privileged enough to receive tax exemptions 
were de facto government agencies.43 
 
33 Id. at 371. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 372. 
36 Id. 
37 Walz, 397 U.S. at 668. 
38 Witte, Jr., supra note 2, at 373.  
39 Id. at 374. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 374. 
42 Id. at 374-75. 
43 Id. at 375. 
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b. Equity Tradition 
Tax exemptions at equity were applied by colonial chancery courts with a different 
reasoning than those applied by common law.44  Equity courts exempted religious institutions 
because of their contributions to charitable efforts.45  These exemptions were only granted to 
religious institutions that engaged in charity.46  The courts viewed the activity itself to determine 
the charitable character.47  Religious institutions were also utilized to “host town assemblies, 
political rallies, and public auctions, to hold educational and vocational classes, to maintain census 
rolls and marriage certificates, to house the community library, and to discharge a number of other 
public functions.”48  Additionally, the “[p]arsonages were used not only to house the minister’s 
family but also to harbor orphans and widows, the sick and the handicapped, and victims of abuse 
and disaster.”49 
In recognition of this work, equity courts would provide tax exemptions and subsidies.50  
Both the amount of the subsidy and the scope of the exemption was calculated on a case-by-case 
basis.51  Certain individuals designated and regulated by the equity courts would visit the religious 
institution to conduct a performance assessment and determine its needs.52  After their visit, they 
would recommend “to the equity court each charity’s entitlement to subsidy and exemption.”53  
The equity courts would then provide the religious institutions “with a second basis for receiving 
tax exemptions for their properties and tax subsidies for their activities.”54 
 
44 Id. at 375. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 376. 
48 Id. at 378. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 378. 
51 Id. at 377.  
52 Id.    
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 378. 
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c. Disruption in the Colonial Patterns of Religious Tax Exemptions  
Colonial laws surrounding the “tax exemption of church property continued largely 
uninterrupted in the early decades of the American republic.”55  However, at a particular point 
three different developments disrupted the “colonial pattern of tax exemption of church 
property.”56  First, the disestablishment of religion within states began to prohibit religious 
establishment within state constitutions.57  Churches that may have previously belonged to a state 
or local government were no longer a subsidized state agency and thus, were no longer in 
possession of what was considered tax-exempt government property.58  The second, was the 
revocation of English statutes through state constitutional mandates.59  The English Statute of 
Charitable Uses of 1601 was one of the casualties of the revocation of traditional equity law.60 As 
a result, charitable institutions and in turn religious institutions, were no longer under the 
jurisdiction of equity courts.61  This separation eventually led to the demise of equity rationale for 
tax exemptions.62  Third, the presumption that all property was to incur property taxes provided an 
additional burden on the implementation of tax exemptions for religious institutions.63  The 
impression that exemptions could only be granted if it consisted of bringing forth “public welfare” 
or advancing other “good and compelling reasons” dismantled the presumption of providing tax 
exemptions for religious institutions.64 
 
 
55 Id. at 380. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 381.  
58 Id. at 380. 
59 Id. at 383. 
60 Id. at 384. 
61 Id. at 384-85. 
62 Id. at 385.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 386. 
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, WALZ AND LEMON 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”65  The Religion Clauses 
reflect the framers’ initial desire to avoid government entanglement with religion.  The 
Establishment Clause prevents the government from establishing a preferred religion and avoids 
potentially discriminatory laws towards different or opposing religious groups.  The Free Exercise 
Clause proceeds on the notion that people should rarely be forced to do things that oppose their 
religious beliefs and the government should not be allowed to override religious beliefs without a 
legitimate reason.  
A. Walz 
The Supreme Court directly confronted the relationship between religious-based tax 
exemptions and the Religion Clauses in Walz, where a property-owner sought an injunction to 
prevent the New York City Tax Commission from granting tax exemptions to religious 
organizations using otherwise-taxable property for religious worship.66  The exemption was 
authorized by New York’s state constitution,67 but the claimant in Walz contended that the 
exemption, in effect, amounted to express government support to religious bodies in violation of 
the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that a complete separation of 
government from religion was not viable. 68  Indeed, as the Court went on to explain, the “very 
existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts – one that seeks to mark boundaries 
 
65 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.  
66 Walz, 397 U.S. at 666. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 676. 
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to avoid excessive entanglement.”69  Chief Justice Burger presented fire and police protection 
received by religious institutions that are afforded by state and local governments to demonstrate 
the inevitable contact that exist between government and religion.70  According to Chief Justice 
Burger, reliance on these services does not diminish a genuine expectation of separation between 
government and religion.71  Chief Justice Burger turned to the issue at hand and similarly 
determined that tax exemptions were not aimed at the establishment, sponsorship, or support of 
religion. 72  In particular, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that “[n]othing in this national attitude 
towards religious tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given 
the remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion and on the contrary it has operated 
affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious beliefs.”73 
Regarding the assessment of excessive government entanglement with religion, the Court 
determined that religious tax exemptions create “only a minimal and remote involvement between 
church and state.”74 The involvement is far less than the taxation of religious institutions.75  
Therefore, the Court reasoned that tax exemptions were not in violation of the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment because  “[n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible.”76 
The Court in Walz then identified parameters that allow tax exemptions to presume a 
constitutional identity.  Whereas it may be unconstitutional to grant tax exemptions to only some 
religious groups, that was not the case in Walz and is generally not permissible. Tax exemptions 
are not utilized for the “advancement or inhibition of religion.” 77  Providing religious tax 
 
69 Id. at 670. 
70 Walz, 397 U.S. at 676. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 675-76.  
73 Id. at 678. 
74 Id. at 676. 
75 Id. at 674.  
76 Id. at 670. 
77 Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.  
10 
 
exemption does not single out any particular church or religious group. 78 Tax exemptions are 
granted to “all houses of religious worship . . . .”79  Neither are the qualifications for tax exemptions 
intended to be “perpetual or immutable,” tax-exempt groups may lose their status if their activities 
no longer satisfy the parameters defined by the legislature, while new religious institution may 
develop and receive tax exempt status.80  Tax exemptions simply guarantee a “reasonable and 
balanced attempt to guard against th[e] dangers,” of exercising economic hostility towards religion 
on behalf of the government.81 
B. Lemon 
In Lemon the Court reviewed a case with a particular focus on entanglement concerns 
regarding statutes that granted aid to church-related elementary and secondary educational 
facilities.82  Both of the statutes at issue were challenged as being in violation of the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.83  The 
Court held that both statutes were unconstitutional.84 
The Court predicated its decision on the finding that the enacting legislatures had 
recognized that “church-related elementary and secondary schools have a significant religious 
mission and that a substantial portion of their activities is religiously oriented.”85  Therefore, the 
legislature would be obligated to create statutory restrictions to “guarantee the separation between 
secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that state financial aid supports only the 
former.”86  The Court ultimately reasoned that:  
 
78 Id. at 673. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 625. 
85 Id. at 613. 
86 Id. 
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All [the] provisions [utilized to create statutory restriction that guarantee separation 
between secular and religious educational functions] are precautions taken in 
candid recognition that these programs approached, even if they did not intrude 
upon, the forbidden areas under the Religion Clauses. We need not decide whether 
these legislative precautions restrict the principal or primary effect of the programs 
to the point where they do not offend the Religion Clauses, for we conclude that 
the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each 
State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.87 
 
Chief Justice Burger, writing once again for the majority, clarified that “under the statutory 
exemption before [the Court] in Walz, the State had a continuing burden to ascertain that the 
exempt property was in fact being used for religious worship.”88  The Court then identified, that 
to “determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, [courts] must 
examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited” and should be cautious 
of “‘programs whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of administration . . . .’”89 
After analyzing the statutes and assessing whether a secular legislative purpose existed, and 
finding that it did; and analyzing whether the statutes’s principal or primary effect advanced or 
inhibited religion, and deciding that secular and religious education is identifiable and separable;90 
the Court ultimately asserted that the very need to engage in surveillance in order to enforce the 
statutes demonstrated sufficient entanglement to invalidate the statutes as unconstitutional.91  
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, echoed this concern and asserted that the state’s power 
to dictate what is or is not secular or religious, is sufficiently apt to “promote rancor and ill-will 
between church and state” that would result from the surveillance the statute in Lemon required.92 
 
87 Id. at 613-14. 
88 Id. at 614.  
89 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
90 Id. at 612-13. 
91 Id. at 620. 
92 Id. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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A connection exists between the entanglement depicted in Lemon and the entanglement 
concerns that arise from state and local government practices of taxing portions of religious 
institutions. Just as the statute in Lemon that required state actors to separate secular and religious 
lessons was deemed unconstitutional entanglement, allowing the government to divide and 
determine what portions of a religious institution counts as taxable also creates entanglement 
concerns between state and church. 
III. MODERN TAX EXEMPTIONS  
All fifty states now grant tax exemptions for property belonging to religious institutions.93  
The language used within the particular constitutional section or statutory provision varies.94  
Some states use narrow language such as “religious worship” to maintain stringent control on tax 
exemptions, while other states use less stringent language such as “religious purpose,” which 
broadens interpretation.95  “Religious Worship” allows state and local governments to maintain 
stringent control on tax exemptions because the government must determine if the activity taking 
place on the property qualifies as exempt religious worship.96  The government does so by 
considering the regular services, ceremonies, rituals, religious instructions, the exclusivity of the 
group and other activities directed towards a higher being.97  “Religious purpose” on the other 
hand is less restrictive and is defined in a broad manner that encompasses a general range of 
activities.98  The varying language used within different state constitutions and statutes are 
 
93 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 676. 
94 Evelyn Brody, All Charities Are Property-Tax Exempt, but Some Charities Are More Exempt Than Others, 44 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 621, 671-72 (2010). 
95 4 WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & ROBERT T. SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 
33:16 (2d ed. 2017). 
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
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indicative of the various approaches states are taking when granting tax exemptions to religious 
institutions. 
As indicated in Walz, the determination as to whether a religious institution is in fact a 
religious institution worthy of obtaining a tax exemption is an appropriate question outside of the 
parameters of entanglement concerns.99  This is so because the Court determined that both taxing 
religious institutions and exempting religious institutions gave rise to some degree of involvement 
with religion.100  However, the Court found that the elimination of exemptions would “expand the 
involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax 
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal 
processes.”101  The Court deemed that no genuine nexus existed between a tax exemption and the 
establishment of religion.102  The Court went on to express that “[t]he exemption creates only a 
minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches.  
It restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce 
the desired separation insulating each from the other.”103   
Although most states differ in determining whether the property must be used for religious 
worship or purpose, the language within state constitutions and state statutes are relatively concise 
and generally read as follow: “all property used exclusively for religious … purposes … shall be 
exempt from taxation . . . .”104  The concise language utilize by state legislators provides room for 
interpretation.  However, if a state is to utilized Chief Justice Burger’s assertion in Lemon as to 
“the character and purposes” of a religious institution to determine deference for tax exemptions, 
 
99 Walz, 397 U.S. at 676. 
100 Id. at 674. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 675.   
103 Id. at 676. 
104 OKL. CONST. art. X, § 6. 
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it must do so broadly.105  As indicated in Walz, religious institutions get broad protections under 
the Religion Clauses to avoid state-religion interactions that would harm either the state or 
religion.106  Nevertheless, states still tax portions of religious institutions that they deem separate 
from the religious worship or purpose.  However, once a religious institution has been deemed 
worthy of a tax exemption, no standard exists to avoid or define what portions of that religious 
institution’s property may count as being utilized for sufficient religious worship or purpose.  
In an effort to tax religious institutions, state and local governments have developed 
different tests or standards to identify when portions of a religious institution are taxable.  State 
statutes and courts have applied standards such as the reasonably necessary standard,107 which 
assesses how necessary a particular portion of a religious property is to the objective of the 
religious institution; the exclusive use standard,108 which assesses if the property’s sole use is 
religious in nature; and the dominant purpose test,109 which determines if the primary use of the 
property is religious in nature.  These standards or test create an entanglement between state and 
church through the required surveillance necessary to utilize them.  An examination of a religious 
property dispute through any of the standards requires courts to infringe on the Religion Clauses. 
A. Reasonably Necessary Standard 
The reasonably necessary standard considers whether a parsonage is reasonably necessary 
for the accomplishment of the religious institution’s objectives.110  In German Apostolic Christian 
Church v. Department of Revenue,111 the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed a decision from the tax 
 
105 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. 
106 Walz, 397 U.S. at 673 
107 German Apostolic Christian Church v. Dep't of Revenue, 569 P.2d 596, 599 (Or. 1977).  
108 Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization, 428 S.W.3d 800, 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). 
109 Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors of Attleboro, 71 N.E.3d 509, 517 (Mass. 2017). 
110 German Apostolic Christian Church, 569 P.2d at 599. 
111 569 P.2d 596 (Or. 1977). 
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court regarding the language in an Oregon statute112 that allowed the exemption of only portions 
of an ad volerem property tax on religious institutions.113  The text of the relevant statute allows 
an exemption for religious institutions that primarily use the property for the goals of the religious 
institution.114  If a religious institution were to claim tax exemption for a portion of its property 
used for charitable purposes, the exemption requires that the charitable use is in the “advancement 
of religion and must be primarily115 for the benefit of the institution as well as reasonably 
necessary for the furthering of the religious aims of the” religious institution.116 
The issue in German Apostolic Christian Church arose after the construction of a new 
building on its property using donations, and monetary/manual labor gifts.117  When the project 
was completed it was used for several purposes, including housing for the Administrating Elder of 
the congregation, a guest area with three bedrooms, and six apartments for elderly members of the 
church.118  After its completion the County Assessor determined that the property was subject to 
assessment for the following tax year.119 
 
112 307.140 Property of religious organizations. 
Upon compliance with ORS 307.162, the following property owned or being purchased by religious organizations 
shall be exempt from taxation: 
(1) All houses of public worship and other additional buildings and property used solely for administration, 
education, literary, benevolent, charitable, entertainment and recreational purposes by religious 
organizations, the lots on which they are situated, and the pews, slips and furniture therein. However, any 
part of any house of public worship or other additional buildings or property which is kept or used as a 
store or shop or for any purpose other than those stated in this section shall be assessed and taxed the same 
as other taxable property. 
(2) Parking lots used for parking or any other use as long as that parking or other use is permitted without 
charge for no fewer than 355 days during the tax year. 
(3) Land and the buildings thereon held or used solely for cemetery or crematory purposes, including any 
buildings solely used to store machinery or equipment used exclusively for maintenance of such lands. 
113 German Apostolic Christian Church, 569 P.2d at 597. 
114 Id. at 599. 
115 This essay addresses the dominant use standard in a separate section.  
116 German Apostolic Christian Church, 569 P.2d at 599. 
117 Id. at 597. 
118 Id. at 597-98. 
119 Id. at 598. 
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At the conclusion of an evidentiary trial, the Tax Court found the first floor office, a 
basement meeting area, and a vault to be exempt from taxation.120  The remainder of the building 
however, was taxable.”121  The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the assessment and determined 
that through the statutory language “the Tax Court was correct in allowing an exemption for the 
office room in the Administrating Elder’s residence but disallowing further exemption.”122  The 
court asserted that it received insufficient evidence “as to the necessity of a parsonage including 
the specific duties of [the Administrating Elder living on the property] which require his 
continuous presence near the house of worship of the church.”123 
When determining whether the guest area for visiting church officials was entitled to tax 
exemptions, the court reviewed the language within the statute.124  Although the amount of times 
the property was used was not a factor in and of itself, it was indicative of the reliance on the guest 
area or lack thereof.125  The court expressed that “[i]nfrequent use of the property may indicate in 
part that such utilization is not reasonably necessary for the advancement of church aims,”126 and 
the church presented “insufficient evidence of the necessity for [the] area.”127  The court also found 
“that the portion of the property used as a guest area for visiting church officials was not entitled 
to an exemption . . . .”128  The court held that the charitable and nonreligious use of the portion of 
the property that provided low-rent apartments to the needy and older members of the church’s 
congregation was tax exempted because of the charitable purpose.129 
 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 German Apostolic Christian Church, 569 P.2d at 600. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 600-01. 
129 Id. at 602. 
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The reasonably necessary standard in German Apostolic Christian Church, allowed the 
court to consider whether a portion of the church’s property was reasonably necessary for its 
religious mission.  Like the unconstitutional surveillance necessary in Lemon to determine which 
classes were secular or religious, the surveillance necessary here to determine whether a portion 
of a property belonging to a religious institution is reasonably necessary, allows the court to first 
determine what it believes to be reasonably necessary and then requires monitoring by secular 
authorities to ensure that religious groups follow those standards.  That in and of itself is 
detrimental to the wall between state and church.  
 The court in German Apostolic Christian Church made clear that convincing evidence 
was necessary to demonstrate the requisite nexus to the organization’s religious mission.  
However, the court does not provide what may satisfy such a standard.  Essentially, the court is 
creating in itself unfettered power that may continuously change with individual bias.  What is 
reasonable to one judge may not be reasonable to the next and what is reasonable in one religion 
may not be reasonable in the next.  The individuality and uniqueness associated with different 
religious beliefs cannot be restricted by a subjective reasonable standard.  Simply put, if a court 
invites individual judges to define what is reasonable it creates an unconstitutional standard that 
supports the entanglement of state and church.  
B. Exclusive Use Standard 
The exclusive use standard assesses whether the property’s sole use is religious in nature.130  
This assessment in and of itself presents an entanglement concern between state and religion.  For 
example, in a recent and controversial decision, a Tennessee court deemed portions of a “mega-
church” taxable.  In Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization,131 Christ 
 
130 Christ Church Pentecostal, 428 S.W.3d at 807. 
131 428 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). 
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Church Pentecostal (“CCP”), completed construction of a multi-million dollar building known as 
the Hardwick Family Life Center (“the Center”).132  The Center contained “space for worship and 
fellowship; classrooms; offices; an indoor playground, the ‘For His Glory’ bookstore/café area; 
and the Hardwick Activity Center (“HAC”), which includes a fitness center and gymnasium.”133  
After a site visit in 2007, a staff attorney for the State Board of Equalization determined that most 
of the new building was tax-exempt.134  However, the staff attorney denied the exemption for 
portions of the building containing the bookstore/café area and the fitness center/gymnasium on 
the grounds that they were retail/commercial in nature and not used for religious purposes.135  CCP 
appealed and the matter was heard by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).136  In 2009 the judge 
affirmed the denial of the exemption for the bookstore/café and “granted a fifty percent exemption 
for the fitness center area on the basis that it was used for CCP’s youth recreational activities in 
addition to general public use on a membership fee basis.”137 
CCP filed a petition with the chancery court, asserting that the evidence submitted to the 
ALJ and the Commission demonstrated that the bookstore/café and fitness centers were integral to 
one or more of the church’s religious purposes.138  CCP claimed that the Commission’s decision 
violated Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Establishment Clause, insofar as 
it turned on an official determination as to the religious purposes of CCP.139  The chancery court 
affirmed the decision and CCP filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals of 
Tennessee.140 
 
132 Christ Church Pentecostal, 428 S.W.3d at 804. 
133 Id. at 804-05. 
134 Id. at 805. 
135 Id.  
136 Id.  
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 806. 
19 
 
CCP claims that a violation of the Religion Clauses was at issue, the court however, 
asserted that the state’s constitution deems all property taxable unless it is “duly exempted.”141  
The court explained that it is undisputed that CCP is a religious institution and a majority of its 
property is exempt from taxation, however, a portion of CCP’s property is not used for exempt 
purposes.142  The court held that although the areas in question may have been in place to attract 
new members, exemptions were not intend to apply to such uses.143  Under this premise, the court 
determined that the “exclusive use” standard applied to the “direct and immediate use of the 
property itself and to any indirect and consequential benefit to be derived from its use.”144  “The 
requirement is met when ‘the use is “directly incidental to or an integral part of” one of the 
recognized purposes of an exempt institution.’”145  The court reasoned that the bookstore/café and 
the fitness center areas were not purely and exclusively for religious purposes.146  
CCP asserted that the determination by the Commission and the trial court “excessively 
entangles the government with church doctrine and theology and substitutes the wisdom of the 
state for the doctrine of the church in contravention of the Establishment Clause.”147  The court 
disagreed and determined that “although laws may not interfere with religious belief, they may 
interfere with conduct that is religiously motivated.”148  CCP asserted, however, that “the 
determination that it did not use the disputed areas of the Family Life Center exclusively for the 
purpose for which CCP exists as a religious institution impermissibly entangle the State in matters 
 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 807-08. 
143 Christ Church Pentecostal, 428 S.W.3d at 812. 
144 Id. at 812 (citing Book Agents of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. State Bd. of Equalization, 514 S.W.2d 513, 
524 (Tenn. 1974)). 
145 Id. (quoting Methodist Hosp. of Memphis v. Assessment Appeals Comm’n, 669 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tenn. 1984)). 
146 Id. at 814. 
147 Id. at 814-15. 
148 Id. at 815. 
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of church doctrine by defining a ‘religious use.’”149  CCP relied on a Colorado case which claims 
that “avoiding a narrow construction of property tax exemptions based upon religious use also 
serves the important purpose of avoiding any detailed governmental inquiry into or resultant 
endorsement of religion that would be prohibited by the establishment clause of the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution.”150  The court rejected the contention because it was 
“predicated on the character of the taxpayer and on the manner in which the taxpayer used the 
property.”151   
CCP introduced more case law in support of its First Amendment claim relying on a New 
York case where the court observed that “[i]n the tax context, the first amendment requires the 
court to accept the entity’s characterization of its activities and beliefs as religious as long as the 
characterization is in good faith.”152  The court dismissed that observation as well, claiming that 
the “imposition of property tax on church property that is, by character and manner of use, 
essentially commercial in nature does not interfere with CCP’s doctrine, beliefs, faith, or 
government.”153  The court ultimately held that “‘[r]eligious institutions are not above the law . . . 
.’”  Therefore, a “State may, ‘enact and enforce facially neutral and uniformly applicable laws that 
have the incidental effect of burdening a religious practice.”154  The court’s assertion that a state 
may incidentally burden religious practices is questionable because the Court in Walz expressed 
that to assess the entanglement concerns of a particular act one must look beyond the language of 
the statute and to the effect it has on religious practices.155  
 
149 Christ Church Pentecostal, 428 S.W.3d at 816. 
150 Id. at 816 (citing Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1333 n.21 (Col. 1989)). 
151 Id. at 817. 
152 Id. at 818 (citing Holy Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm’n, 435 N.E.2d 662, 
663 (1982)). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 820. 
155 Walz, 397 U.S. at 677. 
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Nevertheless, the court in Christ Church Pentecostal, relied on the “exclusive use” 
standard, to determine that the property in question was not directly incidental to the religious 
purposes of the church.  However, in utilizing such a standard, the court implicated the very 
entanglement problems that the Supreme Court cautioned against in Lemon.  The Court in Christ 
Church Pentecostal could not have known whether or not CCP was utilizing the property solely 
for religious use unless it reviewed and refused all arguments brought forth by CCP.  This is 
especially relevant because CCP’s argument for constructing the entire center was “to reach out to 
the community and minister to their needs; something that is a direct purpose of the Church.”156  
The court rejected CPP’s claim and instead determined that CPP’s use of the area was far from 
traditional,157 specifically the court pointed towards the Center’s paid staff and the gym’s fee-
based membership.158  However, the court failed to assess the value of the underlying purpose for 
the Center: CPP’s religious mission. 
In Lemon, the Court recognized that “a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school 
affiliated with his or her faith operated to inculcate its tenents, will inevitably experience great 
difficulty in remaining religiously neutral.”159  That is exactly the case in Christ Church 
Pentecostal, regardless of the initial commercial nature of portions of the property, according to 
CCP, the entire premise is consumed with the religious intent to accumulate new church attendees 
and to strengthen their religious mission.160  CCP provided its religious understanding as to why 
the property was relevant to their institution.  If that reasoning is insufficient to satisfy the court’s 
analysis of the property for taxation purpose, what would be?   A bench is simply a bench before 
 
156 Christ Church Pentecostal, 428 S.W.3d at 808. 
157 Id. at 814. 
158 Id. at 813-14.  
159 Id. at 618. 
160 Id. at 808. 
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it is placed in a church and deemed a pew.  Similarly, CCP may have built commercial properties, 
but the commercial properties are utilized for CCP’s mission thus, altering the properties’ purpose. 
If CCP’s sole intent was motivated by the continual growth of their congregation and religious 
mission, the religious purpose should be clear.  Demanding that a religious institution’s property 
be used exclusively for outright religious purposes as allowed by a court of law drains the 
community of a source that may provide more than a weekly religious service.  Many religious 
institutions utilize common areas for several things outside of the confines of exclusive religious 
use. These uses include weddings, birthday parties, and other similar communal gatherings.  Courts 
should not be able to tax communal portions of religious institutions simply because it is not used 
exclusively for a religious purpose. Doing so would force courts to make doctrinal determinations 
as to the religious purposes of different parcels belonging to religious institutions. 
C. Dominant Purpose Test 
The dominant purpose test considers, each portion of church property, and determines 
“whether its dominant purpose is religious worship or instruction, or connected with religious 
worship or instruction (and is therefore exempt from taxation), or whether its dominant purpose is 
something other than religious worship or instruction (and therefore has been ‘appropriated for 
purposes other than religious worship or instruction’).”161  In Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. 
v. Board of Assessors of Attleboro,162 for example, the Shrine, a “Catholic religious organization 
affiliated with the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette,” opened a national shrine in Attleboro, 
Massachusetts in 1953,163 which thousands of people visit each year.164  In 2012 the city assessor’s 
 
161 Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc, 71 N.E.3d at 517. 
162 71 N.E.3d 509 (Mass. 2017). 
163 Id. at 512. 
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determined that the Shrine owed property taxes based on the valuation of the property.165  The 
Shrine paid its property taxes with interest and filed an abatement the following year. 166  The city’s 
board of assessors denied it.167  The assessors’ valuation divided the Shrine’s property into eight 
distinct portions.168  Of the eight, the board determined that the welcome center, the maintenance 
building, the safe house, and the wildlife sanctuary were fully taxable.169 
The court in Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc., rejected “Shrine’s argument that the 
dominant purpose test is an ‘all or nothing’ test regarding the exemption of church property, i.e., 
that an assessor must look at the entirety of a church’s property and determine whether the 
dominant purpose of that property is religious worship or instruction, such that the entirety of the 
property is either exempt or not.”170  Instead, the court found that the clause that grants the tax 
exemptions for religious institutions also limits it.171  The corresponding clause  provides “that the 
exemption shall not ‘extend to any portion of any such house of religious worship appropriated for 
purposes other than religious worship or instruction.’”172  Exploiting that language, Massachusetts 
taxing authorities deemed it appropriate to divide the properties of religious institutions to 
determine which portions could be taxed.173  And thus, Shrine’s extensive property consisted of 
portions that were taxable and portions that were tax exempt.174  The court ultimately determined 
that the dominant purposes of the welcome center and maintenance building were to facilitate 
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religious worship, whereas the dominant purposes of the safe house and the wildlife sanctuary 
were not.175 
The court’s analysis in Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc., is indicative of the inherent 
flaws within the dominant purpose test.  The test is flawed because it requires courts to determine 
how much of a religious institution’s property must be used and what.  For instance, the wildlife 
sanctuary, according to Shrine was used for meditative walks and was deemed connected to the 
religious worship of the Shrine.176  The court however, dismissed that argument because the 
wildlife sanctuary was transferred to the Massachusetts Audubon Society to manage and perform 
a range of conservation-related activities.177  The court pivots its argument on the legislative intent 
and asserts that the legislator did not intend to include a wildlife sanctuary or even a safe house to 
qualify as a house of religious worship.178  Although the court’s understanding of the legislators 
intent may be accurate, legislators are bound by the Constitution and creating policy that leads the 
government to control churches, is unconstitutional.  If the dominant purpose test requires a court 
to look at a property and determine which portions of that property are engaging in what kind of 
activity, the court is interfering with religious beliefs because it places the identification of the use 
of the property in the hands of a court.  Despite having a truly religious purpose for a parcel, a 
court may reject its reasoning and deem it insufficient for a tax exemption.  This action by a court 
belittles the religious groups intended purpose for the property and their identification of what 
purpose that property serves for the advancement of their religious beliefs. A court acting in this 
manner poses entanglement concerns endangering the religious freedom that religious 
organizations enjoy to practice their beliefs.  
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
It is apparent that some kind of interaction will occur between state and religion.  In 
light of this reality, it would be logical to create a viable standard in which states may 
potentially collect taxes from religious institutions that are maximizing profits from their 
commercial entities.  The standard should go as follows, if a religious institution uses a portion 
of its property to derive profits from a commercial entity that surpass all operational cost, that 
profit should be taxed.  This form of taxation may potentially go beyond the confines of a 
typical property tax, however, it would provide a feasible manner in which state and local 
governments can attempt to avoid entanglement concerns while collecting taxes from churches 
who may commercialize outside of the ordinary confines of religion.  
For example, if CCP’s annual operational fee, including all good faith expenses 
necessary to exist were $200,000, and the commercial properties were returning profits of 
$400,000, the state or local government should be able to tax the difference between the 
returning profit and the good faith expenses necessary to exist.  Here, that would result in 
$400,000 - $200,000 = $200,000 of taxable income.  
However, even this suggestion may create entanglement concerns from the assessment 
of financial statements that churches provide.  Nevertheless, the standard is minimally intrusive 
because religious institutions would provide their prepared expenses. Furthermore, a simple 
formula is being utilized without the biases of human involvement.   Potentially, a standard 
like this would secure tax exemptions for religious institutions and may prevent commercial 
organizations from abusing religious tax exemptions.  
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V. Conclusion 
Ultimately, analyzing and normalizing surveillance over religion institutions in any 
capacity is unconstitutional. As established in Lemon; 
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be entirely 
excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the 
affairs of government. The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private 
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that 
while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.179 
 
179 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625. 
